n May 1833, the London Times reported that "an animal of a strange and unnatural appearance" had "taken up its abode in the neighbouring woods" of the village of Coulsden, Surrey:
It has been seen by a great many persons, but the several descriptions are much at variance with each other. All declare that it is something of the dog or wolf species, but all agree that they never saw the like before. It is thought by the more rational part, who are willing to assign a natural cause for the visit of this animal, that it has escaped from some menagery; but the superstitious are inclined to the belief that it is a supernatural being, come to terrify the wicked for their sins. (3c) The article highlights the bafflement of the villagers, who turn inwards to the only logical explanation for such a "strange and unnatural" creature: themselves. Whether the animal originated in a menagerie (a configuration of animals displaced from their natural environment) or the animal is a supernatural being that represents the people's guilt, the creature is a human projection. Mute, separated from the human population, and out of its own context, the animal is an outward copy of some inner portion of the observing humans.
Defining "the animal" and its human relationships preoccupied many writers who mobilized awareness of animal treatment during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, an era that witnessed a new awareness of animals' physiological and emotional similarity to humans .1 Deborah Denenholz Morse and Martin A. Danahay note that animals-especially those seen as "'out of place' and thus to have escaped conventional categories," like the Coulsden animal-became "the canvas on which a culture [could] sketch the range of its many, and often contradictory, attitudes toward both the 'animal' and the concept of 'nature' as a zone purportedly separate from the human that needs either to be exploited or protected" (4-5). Purportedly is a significant term, for, as Morse and Danahay clarify, "the status of the 'animal' also brings into question the status of the 'human' as the two cannot be seen in isolation" (5). As the animal rights movement progressed into the 1830s and 1840s, the connections between animal and human were underscored by the Industrial Revolution; social-reform writers used animals to explore technology's effect on humanity and its relationship with nature, projecting their fears about technology's dehumanizing influence onto animals, much as the people of Coulsden projected their sins onto the "strange and unnatural" creature in their neighbourhood.2
Fears about technology's dehumanizing effects surface in the didactic reform novel Helen Fleetwood (1841), in which Charlotte Elizabeth Tonna laments the failure of factory owners "to raise [workers] somewhat above the level of the beasts that perish-somewhat above the insensible machinery against which their feeble limbs must toil in an agonizing race" (176). Born in England in 1790, Tonna was a staunch Evangelical who espoused a number of social causes. She was also a prolific writer, publishing novels, poetry, short stories, religious tracts, political pamphlets, and an autobiography, as well as editing the Christian Lady's Magazine during the 1830s and 1840s. Her fiction and non-fiction about factory reform were influential during the industrial reform movement's early years.3 Basing Helen Fleetwood on her research on parliamentary blue books, Tonna portrayed the atrocities of factory work in order to gain sympathy for two major causes (the repeal of the New Poor Law of 1834 and the passing of the Ten Hours Bill) and to teach responses to the breakup of the national family and the now jeopardized nuclear family Gallagher 127) .4 Her overall objective was to highlight the injustice of a system that suppressed the humanity of the working poor.
Scholars studying didactic social-reform fiction like Tonna's have shown how the genre used nature to counter both the mechanization of factory workers and the metaphorical mechanization of society. Yet this scholarship has overlooked animals' complex role in negotiating the relationship between humans and technology. I will argue that to understand how nature informs didactic social-reform fiction, we must pay more attention to the "animality" of the texts' content and conventions.
I will demonstrate the importance of animals in social-reform arguments by looking at Helen Fleetwood, a novel well suited to a mode of inquiry that brings together animal studies and social-reform scholarship. I will first examine the relationships among machines, animals, and humans in the context of both Victorian paradigms of social structure and social-reform writers' methods of narrating social structure. I will then analyze how Tonna depicts animals differently in rural scenes and industrial scenes as she illuminates problems in society's conceptualizing of labour and proffers her own "nature-based" solution. Finally, I will argue that this nature-based solution is complicated by the traces of technology in Tonna's narration. My analysis will demonstrate how Tonna's social-reform argument, written when animals took on new significance for understanding labour, both shapes and is shaped by animality. nature and the Machine in early victorian england As Morse and Danahay's collection of essays demonstrates, Victorian novelists relied on animals to explore a host of subjects, including gender ideology, sexuality, attitudes toward science and evolution, parenting, and criminality. Frequently, animals allowed novelists to explore the nature of humanity itself. From Bertha Mason, the "clothed hyena" lurking in the attic of Charlotte Brontë's Jane Eyre (381), to the animalistic Mr. Hyde in Robert Louis Stevenson's novella, animals and animal language represent the limits of human sanity. In short, animals are what people like Bertha and Dr. Jekyll become when they are not thinking like humans. Taking up this concern, industrial novels such as Elizabeth Gaskell's Mary Barton or Tonna's Helen Fleetwood use animals to explore the fear that machines can take away people's ability to think. In reform novels, animals represent dehumanized workers, embodying anxieties about the "nature" of humans and animals during the Industrial Revolution, when labouring animals were replaced by machinery and the humans who worked the machines risked becoming machine-like themselves.
For example, Sarah Stickney Ellis invokes the animal figure to dramatize the danger of becoming an automaton in the busy materiality of Victorian life. She argues that if women were able to "invest material things with the attributes of mind"-in other words, to think rather than merely do in their everyday lives-then they might "assist in redeeming the character of English men from the mere animal, or rather, the mere mechanical state, into which, from the nature and urgency of their occupations, they are in danger of falling" (461). Ellis's word choice suggests a core connection between the technology of machines and something "technological" in animal nature that can contaminate the human mind.
A significant strand of twentieth-and twenty-first-century philosophy focuses on the technological connections among humans, animals, and machines. In this philosophy, the term "technology" signifies a process that, although related to technological apparatuses like machines, is not reducible to material technology. A century after Ellis wrote, Martin Heidegger would identify modern technology as a challenge to nature that is destructive to humanity because it emphasizes product over process, utility over ontology ("Question" 320) . In this, he distinguishes dangerous, or negative, technology from poetic technology, which David Krell notes is "a way of revealing the totality of beings" (309). As Jacques Derrida argues in his commentary on Heidegger in Of Spirit, for Heidegger an animal's dangerous "technological" nature makes it "poor in world," or unopen to its own ontology (10-12). Ellis's fear that humans will become animals through technology's contamination reflects a Heideggerian paranoia about humanity's grasp of its own ontology; her arguments also suggest that as the machine draws attention to animality within humanity, animals must become part of humanity's self-definition.
Nineteenth-century ideas about social bodies anticipate Heidegger's concept of "animalistic" technology in the ways that they characterize the work-ing classes. As James Richard Simmons notes, even by the 1830s, after many laws had been passed to improve factory conditions, it appeared that factory workers and their children "were victims of the popularity of the principles of Malthusian economics" and "an insignificant part of the surplus population" (338). Mary Poovey identifies two overarching metaphors that governed British leaders' dealings with the "surplus" poor: the social machine and the social body.6 Both models were based on what Poovey calls "abstractions" or "symbolic representations of a system that was too large and complex to comprehend" (42); both supported laissez-faire politics; and, although the social body metaphor "produced a more dynamic picture of the relationship between organisms and their physical environment," both models were machine-like in that they viewed relationships between workers and employers as naturally self-regulating (40). As Patricia Ingham notes, "By the 1830s, … to a large extent the language of political economy and the picture of society as an economic machine became inescapable, as what had at first been taken metaphorically came to be regarded as literal" (12). The machine model of society threatened humanity, if humanity may be partially defined by its capacity for self-reflection, as Heidegger argues. Social-reform fiction like Helen Fleetwood arose to combat this technological outlook on society.
Joseph Kestner asserts that the social fiction of the 1830s is particularly significant because it "confronted the transformation" to industrialization at its onset and laid the foundation for more canonical reform writers like Charlotte Brontë and Elizabeth Gaskell (Protest and Reform 66) . The didactic idealistic novels of the 1830s have been criticized for their failure to realistically depict the working poor or to offer solutions to labourers' oppression; however, Rosemarie Bodenheimer argues that "it is in the shape and movement of narrative rather than in its proclaimed social ideology that we may find the 'politics' of a novel in its deepest … most problematical expression" (3). The novels' narratives embody the very real conflicts and circumstances of social problems because their conventions "define and delimit imagined possibilities for social thought, action, and change" (3). In Tonna's era, a time of industrial upheaval and neglect of the poor, didacticism was wedded to social fiction in an effort to restore social cohesion and concern for the individual. What the modernists and later twentieth-century scholars have sometimes perceived as unsophisticated writing, full of preaching and naïveté, was, in Mary Lenard's terms, a successful attempt to teach "nineteenth-century audiences how to 'read' and respond to social problems," a self-reflective, non-technological way to read a technologically saturated society (68).
In addition to the various religious, domestic, political, and economic environments that influenced the didacticism of 1830s industrial novels, the natural environment shaped reform fiction, as Bodenheimer notes.7 Contesting deterministic discourses that represented lower-class persons as being made depraved by social circumstances, "fictional appeals to nature or to a value-laden past … function[ed] as genuine alternatives: not as better worlds elsewhere but as challenges to the assumptions of a dominant social theory" (9) . This pastoral writing, which Bodenheimer describes as "a kind of writing that asserts or implies a continuity between the human spirit and the natural universe that is distinct from social definitions or placements or character" (115), provides a model for seeing society's members as individuals constructed by nature, in a manner diametrically opposed to the deterministic, social machine model that Poovey and Ingham trace.
Yet, reflecting ecocriticism's rise as a literary critique and the growing popularity of animal studies, the concept of "nature" must be refashioned to encompass the full continuum between animal and human life. At least from Descartes onward, animals have been understood to embody what Heidegger calls "dangerous" technology; as the animal/human distinction has become complicated, this same mechanistic technology has implicated human nature. If all nature is technological, then the non-mechanical pastoral reform that Bodenheimer describes also becomes complicated. When nature is invoked as a formal device to oppose technology-in Bodenheimer's words, as a "genuine [alternative] … to the assumptions of a dominant social theory" (9)-and nature's technological qualities are overlooked or suppressed, fiction's conventions are contaminated with traces of non-reflective technology. The result is a tension between the methodology of social-reform fiction and the kind of environment it tried to write into industrial Britain.
tonna and the technological aniMal
Helen Fleetwood tells the story of the Green family, which consists of the widow Green, her four grandchildren, and the adopted orphan Helen Fleetwood. After their country cottage becomes unaffordable, officials in the parish persuade the Greens to move to a factory town to seek work, insisting that their lives there will be more pleasant. The entire family moves to town, except Richard Green, who remains in the country as an agricultural labourer. For over a year, Helen and the Green children toil in the factories and suffer not only unbearable physical work conditions but also-and which the religious widow Green considers far worse-exposure to moral depredation, from which only Helen remains immune. The end of the novel, in which Helen Fleetwood dies and the widow Green goes to the workhouse, demonstrates the extreme effects of their world's mechanization.
For Tonna, animals provide a locus for exploring the degree to which industrial society has mechanized its outlook on humanity. As I will discuss, Tonna's central argument is that "dangerous" technology originates in Adam's Fall: animals who behave like machines-and factory workers who behave like these animals-are copies of a human-made technological system. In this she prefigures, in a religiously inflected way, the arguments of late twentiethcentury philosophers who responded to Heidegger's claim that humanity and animality can and should be separated.
Though he does not write from a religious viewpoint, in his "Letter on Humanism," Heidegger argues for a fundamental distinction between human and animal, suggesting that an individual's humanity lies in his or her "essence," but that this essence cannot be reached by distinguishing humans as one creature among many (224, 227). For Heidegger, to base humans on animals is too metaphysical and contaminates the human with the metaphysical: "Metaphysics thinks of man on the basis of animalitas and does not think in the direction of his humanitas" (227). Heidegger's distinction between human and animal rests on his assumption that humans can free themselves from negative technology while animals cannot engage in activity that is not fundamentally technological, that is, activity governed by utility rather than a quest for essence.
In his critique of Heidegger's view of animals, Derrida considers Heidegger's connection between technology and animality through an examination of Heidegger's "hand," which is a manner of Dasein that allows Dasein to think (Geschlecht 171). Heidegger believed that handwriting represented human, reflective speech/thought and could be subsumed by "the imperatives of technical productivity" brought about by the proliferation of typewriters; similarly, he thought that animals, lacking hands that could do more than manipulate things, could not "let the thing be what it is in its essence" (Geschlecht 172-75). Thus, one infers, animals engage with things in only a utilitarian or technological way. But Derrida points out that the distinction between "technological" animals and humans is vexed because humans themselves are inextricably "contaminated" by technology (Of Spirit 10). If humans are already thoroughly saturated by technology in their everyday lives, such that their cognitive processes unavoidably draw on technological processes, and if animals' technological approach to the world is what makes them animals, then, as Morse and Danahay note, "the distinction between human and animal has been eradicated" (Derrida, Of Spirit 11-12; Morse and Danahay 3). In Giorgio Agamben's critique of Heidegger, he claims that Heidegger overlooks the connection between animals and humans in his eagerness to establish animals' otherness. As Agamben explains, Dasein is simply an animal that has learned to become bored; it has awakened from its own captivation to its own captivation-the animal is encapsulated in the human and is the basis of the human, for…if humanity has been obtained only through a suspension of animality… in what sense does Heidegger's attempt to grasp the 'existing essence of man' escape the metaphysical primacy of animalitas? (70) (71) (72) (73) Agamben poses an original animality at humanity's core, suggesting that humans may merely be more sophisticated copies of animals.
In Heidegger's, Derrida's, and Agamben's concerns over hierarchy between humans and animals, the issue of copies and originals is important. Cary Wolfe identifies the original/copy concept as an underlying foundation of the animal/ human relationship, one to which humans return compulsively: "Who or what is miming, and who or what is mimed? Who is 'like' and who is 'same,' who the original and who the copy, who the human and who the animal?" (Animal Rites 180). To develop this idea, Wolfe quotes from Walter Benjamin, who argues that "the highest capacity for producing similarities … is man's," as well as from Michael Taussig, who indicates that the capacity to mime is "the nature that culture uses to create second nature" and that for humans, "the ability to mime, and mime well, in other words, is the capacity to Other" (qtd. in Wolfe 180). As Taussig puts it, humans understand themselves and animals by generating likenesses between human and animal and identifying with an "other," until an original human self becomes a copy of an animal or until an animal appears to be a copy of a human self.
Drawing on the concept of copies and originals, Tonna's theory of animal/ human relationships aligns with Derrida's and Agamben's arguments that humans must learn to see the connections between themselves and animals. Tonna suggests that, in a fallen, industrial world, humans must take responsibility for technology in themselves and in the plant and animal world because humans, not animals, are the originators of dangerous technology, which animals have copied. In an 1844 Sunday-school tract entitled "Kindness to Animals; or, The Sin of Cruelty Exposed and Rebuked," Tonna argues that with Adam and Eve's sin, all living creatures were made to work for their subsistence, and humans began to value animals for their functionality rather than for what they revealed about God. At the moment when humans created what Heidegger might call a product-oriented rather than a process-oriented attitude toward technology-when technology ceased to be ontologically revealing and became merely automatic and instrumental-the technological animal was born. In Taussig's terms, animals' technological nature, the "otherness" for which they have been exploited, is a mimicry of the humans' original technology. By presenting Helen Fleetwood's industrial world as a fallen state, in which workers move from the countryside, like the Edenic animals who were transformed into machinery by original sin, Tonna suggests that dangerous technology has distorted nature's original Edenic form.
Tonna proposes this Edenic nature as a new "original" for industrial society. In the novel's rural scenes, she depicts a world in which humans and animals are individuals whose labour is not dangerously technological but harmonious with their surroundings and valued for more than production. Tonna extracts the "technological animal" altogether, even from the actual animal itself, and instead crafts animals as original, Edenic beings free from technology's contamination generated by humanity's labour needs. Tonna's rural scenes, where animals are originals for humans to copy, form part of her challenge to return to Eden and to reevaluate the technological "assumptions of [the] dominant social theory," which Bodenheimer identifies as a goal of idealized fictional accounts of nature (9) . seeing "naturally": edenic aniMals as poetic technology Nature in Helen Fleetwood is thus presented both nostalgically and as a model for the future. Raymond Williams notes that literature's longing for a perhaps nonexistent rural past, a longing prevalent during the shift from agrarianism to industrialism, is less a matter of "historical error" than a matter of "historical perspective" (10). He explains that as identity and community became more problematic, as a matter of perception and as a matter of valuation, as the scale and complexity of the characteristic social organization increased [and] a whole community, wholly knowable … became harder and harder to sustain, [what was knowable about a community became not] a function of objects [but] a function of subjects, of observers.… And what we have then to see, as throughout, in the country writing, is not only the reality of the rural community; it is the observer's position in and towards it; a position which is part of the community being known. (165) Examining how Tonna observes these changing communities through Helen Fleetwood, Dorice Elliott asserts that Tonna's didactic portrayal of agrarian paternalism is "a carefully articulated call for a kind of social relations that could be transferred to the urban environment of the factories-as well as needing to be preserved in the country" (103). In Williams's terms, Tonna's writing "creates" the rural community. Categorizing Helen Fleetwood as one of the less successful exemplars of pastoral reform fiction, Bodenheimer contends that Tonna's idealized depiction of rural life conveys "that the whole course of industrialization has been a mistake" and "that preindustrial patriarchal society is equivalent to the timeless and always reproducible course of nature" (134). As a result, Bodenheimer argues, her rural scenes "renaturalize an old vision of a social order rather than … provide an interior pastoral from which the workings of the social order may be observed" (134), the interior pastoral being, as previously mentioned, "continuity between the human spirit and the natural universe that is distinct from social [constructions]" (115). It is true that Helen Fleetwood expresses a yearning for a former time, that Tonna's hope that society can return to that time is futile, and that her nostalgia for a "preindustrial patriarchal society" prevents her offering the "faith in individual or asocial virtue" that Bodenheimer outlines as a requirement for an interior pastoral (134). However, Tonna does offer a model for a natural, de-technologized understanding of labour and the relationship between labourers and employers, as is evident from how she deals with Heidegger's negative technology in her countryside descriptions, particularly in her descriptions of animals in Edenic nature. In this sense, she does model an interior pastoral, where labour relationships seamlessly extend non-technological nature into the workplace.
The novel begins with a lengthy encomium on the nature that surrounds Helen Fleetwood as she milks the cows:
Who that has seen the sun's uprising, when his first bright gleam comes sparkling over the billows on a clear autumnal morning, but has felt a thrill of gladness at his heart-an involuntary, perhaps an unconscious ascription of praise to the Creator, who has so framed him that all his innate perverseness cannot bar the entrance of that thrill? (7) From the outset, Tonna indicates that agricultural work ennobles not just because it is physically easier than factory work or because it provides visual pleasure through association with nature; rather, rural working provides the ability to glean from nature's mere existence an awareness of the self as a living being and an awareness that one's "innate perverseness" is overwhelmed by the glory of "creation." Both a context for their labour and an integral part of it, nature provides for Helen Fleetwood a way of approaching work that is only technological in the best sense, a Heideggerian "way of revealing the totality of beings" (Krell 309), a "bringing-forth" of a natural process rather than a "challenging" that requires everything "ordered to stand by, to be immediately on hand, indeed to stand there just so that it may be on call for a further ordering" (Heidegger, "Question" 319-22). As she works, Helen "somehow" feels "hearty and alive"; her being, in Heidegger's terms, is thrown into relief through her connections with natural surroundings (9) . Although, like those of Heidegger's peasant woman (Heidegger, "Origin" 158-59), Helen's "thoughts had never learned to clothe themselves in language worthy of the occasion that called them into existence" (Tonna, , the reader is privy to Tonna's articulation of those feelings.8 By privileging the narration of a natural experience as the means of understanding an individual labourer's being, Tonna's text conditions the reader to consider nature as the best setting for work. In reading work as set in nature, the reader views work as connected to and defined by nature rather than by social constructions.
Tonna's argument that nature provides an alternative way of viewing work is strikingly demonstrated through animals in the Edenic countryside. Although the country is not actually Eden-labour exists here, whereas it did not before the Fall-it is Edenic, and Tonna's animals recreate this world before technology. Positioned somewhere between the idyllic nature described in the passage above-the sun, the ocean, and so on-and the humans who inhabit that nature, animals present a possible point of intersection between poetic technology uncontaminated by human constructs and the dangerous technology that in Tonna's eyes originated with humans. As living, breathing, acting beings more closely connected with nature than humans, the novel's animals demonstrate how living entities can work in nature without becoming negatively technologized.
The Green family, whose very name associates them with nature, treats their animals as individual beings with human characteristics (Tonna, Fleetwood 13) . All of the animals-Helen's fowls, James Green's rabbits, and Willy Green's ducks-are regarded as family members (13-15). The animals are also a source of pride: Young Willy Green " [gazes] with admiration at the exploits of his young ducks in their narrow pond," watching the creatures he has tended since his infancy (15). Although some animals are destined to be sold or eaten, during their lifetimes they are valued for more than what they produce. In some cases, the animals are models for leaders of families and society. Describing to Helen his hopes for the future, Richard compares his imaginary future family to a family of fowl that belonged to the Greens:
Look," said he, "at Strut, what a good fellow he is.… Now you see, Helen, how he goes about peeping, and scratching and hunting, and when he finds a nice thing, instead of gobbling it up all alone, he calls them, and looks on better pleased to see them enjoy it than to eat it himself. And then if anybody meddles with the hens or chickens, what a fuss he gets into! … He follows me about, and pecks from my hand; but if I catch a fowl, and frighten it, bounce he flies at me, tries to strike with his spurs, and tells me as plain as he can speak he is going to tear my eyes out … I will be like Strut when I am a man." (185) Apparently, Strut is uncontaminated by product-oriented technology and is instead selfless, aware of his relationship with other beings and willing to sacrifice the material objects he labours for to preserve others' happiness. Strut is a thinking being that experiences pleasure in abstract thought and as a labourer is more than a machine that forays for food. This animal is Edenic: uncontaminated by negative technology, he provides a model of original "nature" for Richard to copy as he prepares to labour for his family.
Just as Tonna articulates how Helen's connection with nature defines her, Richard interprets Strut's motivations from his actions, giving voice to thoughts that Strut himself does not describe. Seeing an animal's natural approach to labour, Richard (and through him the reader) learns to read human labour systems in a re-naturalized, poetically technological way. Through Edenic animals, Tonna champions an ontological methodology for conceptualizing the social body, a methodology that analytically probes the individual's approach to work in nature in order to ascertain what work is and how labour systems should function. Richard, who remains in the country while the rest of the family turns to factory labour, experiences the "value" of saying, "My employer knows me; I am not in his sight a mere piece of machinery, regarded only while it works in his service" (179). Richard's strong belief in the rural setting's humanizing power and employers who view their workers non-technologically contrasts sharply with the "technologized animal" workers in Tonna's factory scenes.
"baiting the trap": aniMals and aniMalistic Mindsets in industry
When the story moves to industrial settings, Edenic nature disappears and work is shaped by human industry. The idyllic peace of the novel's first chapter is interrupted when the widow Green is deceived into removing Helen and the other children from their cottage to a nearby industrial town. This occurs when Mr. Stratton, a parish leader, gives her a pamphlet that "[sets] forth in glowing colors the comfort, the abundance, the independence of those who engaged in [industrial] work," and she finds the proposal to move to town "too delightful a prospect to be relinquished" (31-34). The deceit mirrors that of Adam by Eve, for by falling for this metaphorical fruit, the widow puts her children at risk of losing their clear and uncontested relationships with the plants, animals, and human life around them. They exchange Edenic labour that "brings forth" for industrial labour that "challenges" (Heidegger, . From this point, animals begin to be used negatively, representing not a source of ontological revelation about creation but instead the machination of creatures that epitomizes Heidegger's concept of the animal poor in world. Rather than representing an original purity for humans to copy, animals in industrial settings symbolically show that industrialization has warped what was once nature into a copy of human technological-mindedness.
Tonna describes Mr. Stratton's lie as a baited trap "that was to enclose the victims within its iron fence" (53). By comparing the factory to an "iron" trap, the parish workers to hunters, and the factory workers to animals fooled by bait, Tonna draws on contemporary rhetoric about animal rights. In the nineteenth century, hunting and its associated practices, including trapping, were controversial subjects both because they inflicted pain on animals and because of the perceived negative effects on hunters' characters (Perkins 70). Tonna herself reprimanded young boys who trapped animals for anything but food, declaring that "though the Lord has given you the bodies of his creatures for food, he has never given you their natural liberty, either for your amusement or profit" ("Kindness"). In disparaging hunting, a rural practice, Tonna emphasizes how human activities based on social values corrupt the natural order. The trappers' intellectual and physical superiority over animals allows them to disregard the animals' "natural liberty"; similarly, nineteenthcentury hunters used their wealth to justify their exclusive rights to hunting, a sport forbidden to the middle and lower classes (Perkins 74) . The injustice of leveraging one's social position to use a helpless animal underpins Tonna's critique in Helen Fleetwood of the parish leaders' "trapping" the poor in order to use them for their own convenience.
After the Greens' move, the animalizing of the children worsens. Before they can be employed, a surgeon must determine the children's eligibility to work. The Greens' agent, Mr. M., presses the surgeon to ignore the certificates that prove the children's ages, insisting that "the ordinary strength and appearance … is the rule," because he knows that some of the children are underage (54). After examining each child's limbs and features, the surgeon "rates" the children and pronounces which are approved for work (52). Such treatment demonstrates that he views the children as creatures to be sold based on their utility; he sees only their "substance and muscle" rather than their humanity (52). Throughout the novel, Tonna makes similar references to the animalization of workers. Mrs. Wright, the widow's daughter, describes Mary Green and Helen as "two more lambs for the shambles" (70). Sarah Wright, a cousin of the Greens, has been so maimed by the factory machinery and the overlooker's beatings that she can only crawl on all fours, like an animal (60; 84). When Richard visits the Greens and sees the children working at the mill, he remarks that "they are working babes as [he] would not work a plough-horse" (241).
Helen tells the widow that she is "greatly mistaken" that the overlookers care for the factory children's well-being, noting that they care only "to see everybody feeding the engines, or drawing out the cotton, winding, piecening, and all the rest of the business" (115). She bitterly comments that Mr. Z., the factory owner, would never subject his own daughters to the animalization the children in the mill undergo: "He knows too well that their health would be destroyed by staying even so long in the heat, the steam, the stench and the dust of rooms … and he knows that they would [be ruined by] the vile, filthy talk that his poor labourers use" (120). As Tom South, a friend of the Greens, tells Richard, factory workers "may lie, they may steal, they may drink, they may make themselves no better than the beasts of the earth, so long as they work out their hours of labour, keeping time with the machinery" (220).
Industry even encourages lower-class people to animalize each other. South tells the widow Green that families who depend on their young children's factory wages live "a cannibal sort of life to be eating, as one may say, the flesh off our children's bones, and sucking the young blood out of their veins" (67). His uneasiness about his "cannibalism" derives from his sense that he is made of flesh and bone like his children-that it is wrong to "eat" them because of his similarity to them, which is masked but not eradicated by their positions as workers and owner. The references to meat-eating here conjure up animals: since "vegetables were the diet of Paradise," many in the nineteenth century felt guilty over eating animal flesh because it implicated them in the base aspects of human nature-aggression, cruelty, and exploitation toward beings in whom they saw aspects of themselves (Perkins 124) .
These brief but recurring passages refer to animals as the epitome of dangerous technology. Animals are no longer a means of regenerating an Edenic life; instead, they symbolize what is worst about industrial working relationships. In "Kindness to Animals," Tonna's argument comes into full force as a critique of industry. Animals preserve the industrial labour structure-outside of the Edenic countryside, factory owners distance themselves from their workers by animalizing them in their work with machines. Tonna anticipates a Derridean concept of the relationship between animals, humans, and technology, demonstrating that animality, in a fallen world, is integral to the employers and is the means of their animalizing others. Just as post-Edenic humans overlook the paradox of their relationship with animals, the manufacturer ignores the paradox of his relationship with his employees-he forgets that the animal and technological within himself has been internalized by his human workers. Implicitly, Tonna accuses both the parents of industrial workers and especially the factories' employers for crafting these "beasts of the earth" through their own materialistic "challenging-forth" of technology, as Derrida critiques Heidegger for disregarding the technological connections between humans and animals. The workers' "beastliness" is merely a copy of the technological human originating in the employers.
For Tonna, the degree to which dangerous technology permeates the mind marks the true distinction between spheres of people in industrial settings. Those who fall victim to "the system, the vile, the cruel, the body-and-soul murdering system of factory labour," and especially those who enforce the system, lose their souls in their slavery to productivity and are marked as inferior to those of all economic classes who manage to maintain morality, which Tonna defines as purity from technology (127). The fact that Mr. Z. conceives of his workers as animals who create profit indicates that the nature-based understanding of labour has conceded to the machine-based paradigm that Poovey contends is prevalent in the Victorian era. He "sees" like Heidegger's technological animal. By highlighting fictions that Mr. Z. indulges in about his workers' lives-fictions that their physical and spiritual sufferings are beyond his responsibility-Tonna demonstrates his inability to learn from nature about labour as Richard learns from Strut.
the aniMalized Helen Fleetwood
Despite her overt idealizations, this same dangerous technology is subtly present in both Tonna's Edenic animals in the rural community and in her "reading" of nature. Strut the rooster, for example, is motivated by love and decency, but when threatened he resembles Mr. Z. Richard's description of Strut under stress reveals Strut's mechanical side: Strut will fly at him, strike him, and tear his eyes out, reducing Richard to a material threat that must be managed (185). This survival instinct is similar to the factory owners' willingness to take violent measures to preserve their families' financial and social stability. From this perspective, both Strut and Mr. Z. behave like Heidegger's technological animal, which manipulates with its hand to secure something immediately but does not consider long-term consequences or the ontology of its labour.
From Richard's comparison of Strut with himself, it is clear that Richard, too, embodies that same technological animal core and is even proud of it. While Tonna portrays Strut as an original model, a nostalgically Edenic character that Richard wishes to copy, the end of this passage reveals that Strut is also a copy of the technological human that has existed since Adam and Eve invented economic competition. Strut's technological nature complicates the Edenic relationship between humans and animals in rural scenes; in the end, rural life's underlying negative technology is pressed on Richard. He hopes to earn enough money to support his family members that remain alive and to enable their return to the country. He declares that he is a "free-born man" who works hard for what he wants without "any law to hinder" him (304). But his hopes are dashed when the squire, whom he hoped would continue to increase his wages, refuses to pay enough to support his family and discourages Richard from future plans to earn (305). As with Strut, who ultimately becomes a technological animal to protect what he cares most about, the squire must privilege his self-interest when he determines Richard's wages, even if it means sending Richard's family to the workhouse.
That country life often "technologized" labourers is borne out in other contemporary literature, suggesting that Tonna's idealization of rural animals was concurrently dissembled by other writers. For example, in Elizabeth Gaskell's North and South, with which Helen Fleetwood is often paired, Margaret Hale tells factory worker Nicholas Higgins that she doubts he would find either better wages or better working conditions in the southern countryside. She argues that both industrial and rural workers are animalized:
Both must find it hard to realize a future of any kind; the one because the present is so living and hurrying and close around him; the other because his life tempts him to revel in the mere sense of animal existence, not knowing of, and consequently not caring for any pungency of pleasure, for the attainment of which he can plan, and deny himself and look forward. (275) Margaret cautions Higgins not only that wages are low but, centrally, that he will be oppressed by the labour required, which strips humans of their humanity and intellect, making them "brutishly tired, poor creatures" (279). Mr. Hale seconds Margaret's opinion, telling Higgins that country workers develop "stagnant habits of mind" (275).
Their word choice is strikingly similar to Richard's descriptions of factory workers: "Their minds seemed to stagnate, their spirits to have wholly evaporated, and a sort of indifference, the furthest possibly removed from all feeling of enjoyment, reigned supreme" (269). Gaskell's less biased comparison of rural and industrial labour reveals what Tonna conceals: that an animal mentality toward workers dwells in employers of all situations and settings. The relationship between employers and workers has less to do with location than with technology itself, whatever its form. In the post-Edenic world, the technological animal is an innate part of nature and of labour systems that industrialization did not invent but made more visible.
Because "nature" is finally oversimplified in the novel, its technological qualities hidden under seemingly ontological qualities, Tonna's nature-based methodology for reconceiving society is also compromised. While literal and figurative animals allow Tonna to create the characters of employers and workers in her cautionary tale, the animals themselves lack complex character-they are narrative devices that take the form of partial pieces, original or copied, of human beings to serve a purpose. Even Strut, whom Richard describes as protecting his family, finally serves as an analogy that idealizes human rela-tionships; like the "beasts" to whom Tonna refers to support her argument that industrial workers are animalized, Strut is symbolic rather than actual. Cary Wolfe argues that animal studies is most useful when it sees animals as entities that mark how humans view ethical dilemmas ("Human" 567). Looking at animals as symbolic copies of humans highlights their connections to humans, such as the foundational technological connection between humans and animals drawn by Tonna's Sunday-school tract. But when animals' identities are reduced to just symbols, animals become the generalized "animal" that Derrida decries. As Derrida explains, whenever a person "says 'The Animal' in the singular" to refer to all non-human living things, that person disavows animals' individuality (Animal 31).9 Because employer/worker relationships in Helen Fleetwood are often predicated on animals that lack individual identity, there is no realistic argument for nature-based, ethical reform.
In Helen Fleetwood, the lack of real animals underpins a larger conflict between fictional and realistic constructs of nature. Tonna's self-reflections demonstrate the difficulty of using nature to reveal the ontology of human working relationships:
Let no one suppose we are going to write fiction, or to conjure up phantoms of a heated imagination, to aid the cause which we avowedly embrace.…We will exhibit the tree, we will analyze the soil where it grows, the elements that nourish, the hands that culture it, and the fruit which it ultimately produces; but the secret circulation of its poisonous sap we will not so bare as to contaminate the mind of a youthful reader, or to harrow up the soul of any one. (43) Despite her declaration that she will not write "fiction," Tonna refuses to present the ontological origins of the factory abuses; she is interested only in surface, representational copies of that abuse. Her use of biological termsthe tree, the soil, the fruit-as metaphors indicates that, as with animals, the discussion of human systems should be closely linked to their biological environment, but Tonna ultimately masks that environment when its "poisonous sap" proves too "contaminating." Because Tonna treats animals as beings that can copy and be copied, the narrative itself becomes a being that can be copied, a how-to manual that represses complications and lacks what Walter Benjamin calls "the whole sphere of authenticity" in its "technical reproducibility" (324). In Benjamin's terms, the novel "substitutes a plurality of copies for a unique existence" (324-25).
conclusion As a genre that developed because of the transition from agricultural to industrial labour, and out of changing paradigms of labour structures, industrial reform novels like Helen Fleetwood reveal as much about the ontology of social thought as they do about factory conditions in mid-century England. Joseph Kestner, Mary Lenard, and Rosemarie Bodenheimer have shown that the narrative conventions of social-reform novels mark how their writers coped with or contested "mechanical" views of society; in particular, Bodenheimer establishes that nuanced responses to industrialization cannot be understood by examining only the political, social, and religious environments of social-reform novels.
In Helen Fleetwood, Tonna's treatment of animals shows that the attempts of pastoral arguments to create "a separate ground for social judgment" become complicated by the qualities of industry that the novelists oppose (Bodenheimer 118 ). Tonna creates new biological constructs-reinventing as well as suppressing what an animal is-to suggest exemplary "natural" relationships between human workers. But in its failure to treat animals as more than symbols, the novel ironically becomes as "poor in world" as the animals Martin Heidegger disparages, repressing a thorough analysis of the ontology of Raymond Williams's "knowable community" and instead becoming capable only of functionality (Heidegger, "Origin"). As much as the workers it defends, the novel's conventions are shaped by the "technologizing" of labour in the transition to the Industrial Revolution, a parallel to the factory system that the novel seeks to challenge. In Helen Fleetwood, the pastoral argument is not a separate ground of assumptions-it represents an attempt to establish a separate ground, an attempt complicated by Tonna's inability to escape technology. Tonna's furthering of an animalistic approach to the industrial labour structure clarifies how industrialization highlighted the instability of literary conventions as well as social formations. The animality of Tonna's text indicates that narrated nature in social-reform fiction does not replace social constructions but is dictated by a "nature" beyond the novelist's control-the technological nature that pervades the earth, animals, and humans alike. The efforts of socialreform novelists to restore "humanity" to the industrial world may therefore be less of a quest to reintroduce nature into paradigms of society than a strained effort to escape nature in its most fundamental sense.
• Notes 1 Perkins explains that in addition to adhering to religious beliefs that God had commanded humanity to be kind to all creatures, people during this period became aware that animals could feel pain, began to consider the possibility that animals have souls, and began to fear that animal cruelty was not in keeping with a civilized, enlightened society (22-32). 2 As one example of the connection between working animals and machinery, Elsie B. Michie quotes from the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge's The Horse; With a Treatise on Draught, from London, 1831: "An animal is but a beautiful piece of machinery, and although perfect in its construction, and wonderfully accommodating in its movements, it still, like the engine, has a limited power, and has its peculiar modes of action, its strong and its feeble parts" (150).
3 Although Tonna was a popular writer in her day, her novel received at best scattered attention from scholars over the first half of the twentieth century, and it was not until the 1970s that her significant role as an industrial novelist was acknowledged. After Barbara Kanner and Ivanka Kovacevic pointed out the unique methodology of Tonna's writing-her research into and fidelity to the parliamentary blue book investigations of the factories-Tonna's position as a liaison between the working class and the middle and upper classes sparked scholarly interest (152-53; 156). 4 The New Poor Law made it more difficult for the parish to assist the poor and pressured parish officials into disposing of them by sending them off to work in industrial towns, which is what happens to the Greens in Tonna's novel (Simmons 336) . The Ten Hours campaign sought to restrict the amount of time women could work in the factories to ten hours a day, which would protect them from abuse and allow them to spend more time at home taking care of their families (Dzelzainis 181). 5 For discussions of dehumanization in Tonna, see Kanner and Kovacevic 168; Kestner, Wrongs of Woman 199; Dzelzainis 181; Gallagher 127. 6 According to Poovey, the first metaphor compared society to a factory, in which "the efficient machine … could serve as a paradigm for an efficient, productive society" (38). When the social machine was left to run on its own, the relationship between the working classes and their employers would work itself out in the most beneficial way possible; the goal of this model was not to dehumanize workers, but to bind them together with their employers in a unified effort to keep the machine functional, although this idea worked better in theory than in fact (39). The second metaphor, the social body, posited the population as a body of people that was "naturally healthy" although it occasionally needed "some form of governmentsponsored medical intervention" (40). As a side note, Poovey also points out that mass culture became possible in the mid-nineteenth century because "the technologies capable of materializing an aggregate known as the 'population' had been institutionalized" (4). By "technologies" Poovey refers to census and population statistics, as well as "cheap publications" and "national museums" that functioned as "technologies of representation" (4). 7 Scholars have teased out the relationship that Kestner identifies between social issues and didacticism, which represents one stage in the developing form of those novels. Christine Krueger argues that Tonna's Evangelicalism led her to assume the preacher-like voice and the stark adherence to realism that dominates her narration; by contrast, Mary Lenard highlights the sentimentality that seeps into Tonna's writing, arguing that Tonna was part of a new aesthetic movement that emphasized emotion as a rhetorical tool. Catherine Gallagher concludes that Tonna's didacticism is in part a result of religious and economic forces, which create a tension in her work between free will and determinism that she attempts to suppress by carefully controlling the readers' responses to her story. Ella Dzelzainis points out that Tonna's reform rhetoric is both framed by the domestic ideology she upheld and shaped as a challenge to that ideology, as it makes women prominent in the political sphere (189). 8 In "The Origin of the Work of Art," Heidegger suggests that because the shoes of a peasant woman working in a field are used as equipment, they reveal to an observer the Being of the shoes and the peasant woman, although this is not revealed to the peasant woman herself because she is immersed in the work itself. Yet, because this work is a bringing-forth type of work, the peasant woman is immersed in an ontologically revealing setting, despite the fact that she is not technically conscious of it (158-59).
